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MILITARY COMMISSIONS
Second-Guessing Congress on Military Commissions
By Peter Margulies  Sunday, June 14, 2015, 2:00 PM
Friday’s D.C. Circuit decision on military commissions, Al Bahlul v. United States, rests on a narrow, grudging reading of Congress’s war powers.
Judge Judith Rogers, joined by Judge David Tatel (who ½led a concurrence), vacated the military commission conviction of Ali Hamza Al Bahlul, a
former bin Laden aide, for inchoate conspiracy. The full D.C. Circuit had acknowledged in its en banc opinion last year that Al Bahlul’s acts were
“directly related” to the 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, the panel on remand held Friday that the conspiracy conviction violated Article III of the
Constitution, because military commission judges lack Article III’s protections of judicial independence, such as lifetime tenure. As Judge Karen
Henderson wrote in her insightful dissent, judges Rogers and Tatel misread the Supreme Court’s precedents on non-Article III courts, which have
taken a more pragmatic approach and largely deferred to Congress’s Article I powers. (Full disclosure: along with Jim Schoettler, I wrote an amicus
brief for scholars and former JAGs and national security of½cials asking the panel to uphold Al Bahlul’s conviction.)
 
Deºnitely Not Déjà Vu: From 2014’s En Banc to the Panel’s Decision
Casual readers not steeped in military commission law may regard Friday’s holding as incongruous, since the full D.C. Circuit last years upheld Al
Bahlul’s conviction against a challenge based on the Ex Post Facto Clause (in an opinion by Judge Henderson joined by Judge Tatel, among others,
with Judge Rogers dissenting). Al Bahlul had argued to the en banc court that the Military Commission Act (MCA) of 2006 ½rst gave commissions
jurisdiction over inchoate conspiracy at the time of its passage, yet Al Bahlul’s acts occurred no later than 2001. Consequently, Al Bahlul argued, his
conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause’s requirement that a defendant have adequate notice that his conduct was illegal at the time he
committed the acts at issue. While the MCA also gave commissions power to try violations of the law of war, Al Bahlul argued on appeal that the law
of war as of 2001 did not include inchoate conspiracy.
Last year’s en banc decision applied a highly deferential “plain error” standard to the conviction, since Al Bahlul had forfeited his right to anything
but minimalist review of the Ex Post Facto issue by not asserting it at trial. In ½nding that it was not “obvious” that pre-MCA commissions could not
try defendants on inchoate conspiracy charges, the en banc court cited several factors, including both the U.S. history of inchoate conspiracy
prosecutions in military tribunals and the nexus between Al Bahlul’s acts and the 9/11 attacks, which entailed the murder of U.S. civilians--a clear
war crime. Because trying the inchoate conspiracy charges was not a “plain error” that fatally undermined the fairness of the proceedings, the en
banc court rejected the Ex Post Facto challenge, although the logic of the decision suggested that a less deferential de novo standard could yield a
different result. The en banc court then remanded to a panel to adjudicate whether Al Bahlul’s conviction violated Article III.   
 
Al Bahlul and Waiver of Constitutional Arguments
In Friday’s decision, Judge Rogers got right one preliminary question: whether Al Bahlul forfeited the right to attack his conviction on Article III
grounds. If Al Bahlul had forfeited, the panel would have analyzed the Article III issue under a deferential plain error standard, as the en banc court
had analyzed the Ex Post Facto Clause argument. But Judge Rogers found that Al Bahlul had not forfeited the right to make the Article III argument,
because that argument was structural in nature. Judge Henderson disagreed in her dissent, arguing for application of plain error. The Supreme
Court’s precedents on this issue favor Judge Rogers.
In 2003’s Nguyen v. United States, the Court held that a defendant’s failure to lodge a timely objection did not preclude review of the defendant’s
argument that the presence of a non-Article III judge on a panel reviewing his conviction violated Article III. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for
the Court, drew support from the court’s opinion in 1962’s Glidden Co. v. Zdanok. In Glidden, the court was not deterred by an untimely Article III
objection. It addressed the merits of the defendant’s claim that Article III barred trials in the District of Columbia presided over by retired judges of
the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. After exhaustive analysis, the Court concluded that the courts in question were
actually Article III courts with the judicial protections be½tting that label. This example suggests that functionalists should grapple with structural
questions de novo, instead of relying on the plain error standard.
 
Article III and Military Tribunals: The Duel Between Functional and Protective
Approaches
That ½nding tees up the merits of the Article III issue in Al Bahlul. Military tribunals--both commissions and courts-martial--have been a
battleground in a decades-old contest on the interaction of Articles I and III of the Constitution. The functional view  asks (1) whether a non-Article
III tribunal facilitates Congress’s goals in the exercise of its Article I powers, and, (2) whether a limiting principle curbs the risk to judicial
independence. Cases like Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor and Thomas v. Union Carbide support this functional view. The Court
has pushed back only when, as in 2011’s Stern v. Marshall, permitting a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate a dispute would open the door to
wholesale adjudication of disputes such as tort or contract matters traditionally triable in state courts.
Judge Henderson’s dissent and my forthcoming UC Davis paper re¾ect this functional approach. In Schor, the Court upheld a statute that permitted
an agency to resolve counterclaims regarding a broker regulated by the agency, although the counterclaims would ordinarily be heard in a state
court or an Article III tribunal. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the Court, noted that allowing the agency to hear such claims permitted the
ef½cient adjudication of disputes regarding brokers. Moreover, Justice O’Connor found, the matters covered by the statute were specialized in nature
and limited in scope. Those constraints provided a “limiting principle” that curbed congressional evisceration of judicial independence.   
The functional approach contrasts with what I’ve called the protective approach, championed by Justices Hugo Black and John Brennan and most
recently defended by Steve Vladeck. (See Steve’s Georgetown piece here and Geoff Corn and Chris Jenks’ response here.) The protective approach
rightly regards Article III adjudication as among the most compelling calling cards of American constitutionalism. It is therefore suspicious of any
encroachment on Article III protections. Acolytes of the protective approach read Congress’s Article I prerogatives narrowly and discount the
ef½ciency concerns championed by functionalists. In Al Bahlul, D.C. Circuit Judges Rogers and Tatel embrace the protective approach.
 
Commissions, International Law, and Inchoate Conspiracy    
The dif½culty that drove the majority’s opinion on remand in Al Bahlul concerned the authority of military commissions to try a defendant on
charges of inchoate conspiracy to commit a war crime. The Supreme Court said in 1942’s Ex Parte Quirin (the Nazi saboteurs case) that a military
commission could try defendants for violations of the law of war, which the Court depicted as predominantly, if not exclusively, international in
nature. The Court cited the Constitution’s De½ne and Punish Clause, which authorizes Congress to de½ne and punish offenses against the law of
nations, and also cited Congress’s array of war powers in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. In a crucial passage, the Court described
commissions as an “important incident” of waging war, since commissions deterred an adversary’s wrongful conduct during an armed con¾ict.
According to the Quirin Court, military commissions had ful½lled this role since before the Constitution’s enactment, for example, in General
Washington’s convening of a military commission to try British major John Andre for espionage. At least in cases addressing accepted violations of
the law of war, Quirin found that military commissions are not “courts” within the meaning of Article III, and therefore do not require Article III
protections.
However, (and here’s the rub per Friday’s Al Bahlul panel) international law does not de½ne inchoate conspiracy as a war crime. Inchoate conspiracy
under U.S. law entails merely an agreement between defendants and a minor overt act furthering the conspiracy. In contrast, international law only
authorizes trying conspiracy as a form of liability for a completed act. That is, a defendant who plots to murder civilians can be charged with the
murder of civilians, as long as civilians have in fact been killed. The theory is that a plotter of a murder contributes to the result just as surely as the
person who does the killing. International law since Nuremberg has not recognized inchoate conspiracy, in part because of concerns that charges
based on mere agreement will be too vague and punish guilty thoughts, rather than deeds. For Judges Rogers and Tatel, the lack of clear support in
Quirin for military commission trials of inchoate conspiracy doomed Al Bahlul’s conviction.
 
Al Bahlul’s Conspiracy: Completed in Fact and Function But Not Charged as Such
Al Bahlul’s conspiracy involved administering the “bayat” or Al Qaeda oath of allegiance to two key 9/11 ½gures: Mohamed Atta, the leader of the
hijackers during the U.S. phase of the operation, and Ziad Jarrah, one of the pilots. According to FBI agent Ali Soufan, who interrogated Al Bahlul
(without “enhanced” methods), Al Bahlul also had acted as a “minder” for Atta and Jarrah at Osama Bin Laden’s compound, preventing them from
going off course. Al Bahlul proudly acknowledged in evidence admitted at trial that his conduct played at least an “indirect” role in the 9/11 attacks.
As Judge Henderson noted, this evidence would support a claim that Al Bahlul participated in a conspiracy or Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) that
resulted in the mass murder of U.S. civilians on September 11. JCE requires merely that a defendant be a “cog in the wheel” that results in a
completed war crime. The members of the military commission that convicted Al Bahlul expressly found that he committed the acts alleged.
Unfortunately, for reasons that remain unclear, the prosecution did not charge Al Bahlul with JCE or conspiracy as a form of liability for the
completed act of murder of civilians, but only with material support (which the en banc D.C. Circuit held last year was not a crime triable in military
commissions) and inchoate conspiracy. The members of the jury were instructed that they need not consider whether Al Bahlul’s acts had
contributed to a completed war crime, although the only element missing from the instructions was a complete act, and Al Bahlul never disputed
that the 9/11 attacks had occurred.
 
Necessary and Proper Deºning and Punishing: Back to the Framers
A functional theory would argue that Congress’s power to de½ne and punish violations of the law of nations extends to acts like Al Bahlul’s that
violated international law. Judge Henderson, like Judge Janice Rogers Brown in her insightful concurrence in last year’s en banc decision, explained
that the Framers drafted the De½ne and Punish Clause to enable Congress to navigate through the often confusing waters of international law. A
measure of deference to Congress serves the Framers’ design.
Moreover, the Necessary and Proper Clause, as the Supreme Court ruled recently in U.S. v. Comstock and Chief Justice Marshall wrote in McCulloch
v. Maryland, allows Congress to enact provisions that are “conducive” to exercise of its express Article I powers. Congress could readily have found
that even plotting to commit an acknowledged war crime such as the murder of civilians posed an unacceptable risk that the defendant would
violate international law. Preventing a completed act by intervening at just the right point between the plot and its execution strains government
resources and imperils potential victims. Adding a level of deterrence beyond ordinary civilian courts is conducive to Congress’s aims. Moreover,
requiring an Article III tribunal for a foreign national with no ties to the U.S. who plotted abroad and was captured overseas would require of½cials
to transport the plotter to the U.S. for trial--a consequence that seems “impracticable and anomalous,” per Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in U.S. v.
Verdugo-Urquidez (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to overseas searches of individuals with no U.S. ties).
Furthermore, a limiting principle would check the encroachment of military tribunals on Article III trials: a commission could only try a defendant
on charges that were reasonably related to international law. Under the Military Commission Act, an Article III appellate court reviews legal
questions de novo, easily meeting the standard Justice O’Connor set out in Schor.
In Friday’s D.C. Circuit decision, Judge Rogers rejected this perspective, relying on a cramped reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Judge
Rogers cited Toth v. Quarles, where Justice Black wrote for the Court in holding that a court-martial lacks jurisdiction over a discharged member of
the armed forces. Black argued in Toth that a contrary result would have authorized court-martial jurisdiction over millions of former members of
the armed forces who had made the transition to civilian life. No such concerns are present in Al Bahlul, which does not raise the specter of the
military trial of large numbers of U.S. civilians. When dealing with foreign nationals captured overseas plotting violations of the law of war, the
Necessary and Proper Clause entails greater deference to Congress.
Moreover, Judge Rogers mischaracterized the Supreme Court’s threshold for appellate review of factual determinations by non-Article III tribunals.
Judge Rogers asserted that the Supreme Court has demanded more probing review of the facts than the Military Commissions Act provides.
However, this contention re¾ects an unduly formalistic reading of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Crowell v. Benson. In Crowell, the Court
recognized that, to facilitate Congress’s scheme for ef½cient adjudication of specialized disputes, the agency’s adjudication of facts had to be “½nal.”
[p. 46] The Crowell Court held that, as long as those ½ndings were supported by some evidence, the Constitution was satis½ed. While the “based
upon evidence” standard in Crowell is super½cially less deferential than the MCA, which permits review only of legal questions, in practice this is a
distinction without a difference. A court reviewing a military commission conviction wholly unsupported by evidence would classify that conviction
as an arbitrary decision raising issues of law. In other words, while Judge Rogers read the Necessary and Proper Clause grudgingly, she exaggerated
the Supreme Court’s test for appellate review of facts.  
It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court has never struck down a statute making inchoate conspiracy triable by military commission. In
Hamdan, a plurality of Justices (not including Justice Kennedy) found that inchoate conspiracy was not an international law war crime. However, the
plurality’s principal concern was with allocation of powers between Congress and the President. Justice Stevens’ opinion stressed that his central
problem was with President Bush’s unilateral order granting commissions authority to try conspiracy charges. Justice Stevens expressly reserved the
question of Congress’s power under the De½ne and Punish Clause. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in Hamdan, stressed that Congress was better
situated than the courts to assess the United States’ obligations under international law.
 
Conclusion
In sum, judges Rogers and Tatel are right to address the Article III question de novo. After that initial correct move, however, they construe
Congress’s Article I authority over military commissions far too narrowly, and fail to accord Congress the deference that the De½ne and Punish
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause contemplate. Judge Henderson’s comprehensive and thoughtful opinion may have been the dissent in this
round. Don’t be surprised, however, if Judge Henderson’s opinion provides a template for the last word in this long-running case.
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